The New Federal Law of Labor Injunctions by unknown
The New Federal Law of Labor Injunctions
Since Textile Workers' Union v. Lincoln Mills,' the Supreme Court
has sought to elaborate on the proposition that federal courts must
apply federal labor law in suits brought under § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act.2 This difficult task has often forced the
Court to strike a delicate balance between competing interests. Two
areas in particular have proved troublesome: (1) resolution of the
apparent conflict between the federal labor policy favoring arbitration
provisions in collective bargaining agreements and the policy disfavor-
ing injunctive relief against labor unions; (2) resolution of the tension
between a policy demanding uniformity in federal labor law and one
giving state courts a role in shaping and administering that law. Since
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson3 these two problems, complicated
in their own right, have been intertwined.4
In its latest attempt to explicate § 301, Boys Market v. Retail Clerks
Union,5 the Court overruled Sinclair and held that in conformity with
certain guidelines a federal court may enjoin a strike over a grievance
the parties had contractually agreed to arbitrate, thus making such
injunctions available in the federal courts for the first time in nearly
forty years. After placing the decision in the context of § 301 doctrine,
this Note will both examine the adequacy of the Boys Market guide-
lines as a check on potential judicial abuse of the newly delineated
injunction power and explore the impact of Boys Market on state
courts.
I. The Development of § 301
A. The Federal Law of Injunctions and Arbitration
In 1932, Congress, through the Norris-LaGuardia Act, promulgated
a dear policy against the use of injunctive relief in labor-management
disputes. G Prior to the enactment of Norris-LaGuardia, federal courts
1. 353 US. 448 (1957).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964). § 185 reads in pertinent part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapzer, or
between any such labor organizations, may be brought in an) district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
3. 370 US. 195 (1962).
4. See pp. 1594-95 infra.
5. 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, et. seq. (1964).
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too frequently abused their equity powers by issuing ex parte restrain-
ing orders against union activities at the request of management. These
injunctions were summarily issued at preliminary hearings;1 the courts
granted relief on the basis of the employer's unsupported affidavits
and denied the union opportunity to cross-examine or to present its
own evidence." The orders were usually written in vague, sweeping
language and were designed to enjoin large numbers of people from
participating in a broad range of activities. 9 While judicial abuse of
the injunctive remedy might theoretically be corrected at the perma-
nent injunction hearing or on appeal, in practice the temporary re-
straining order usually defeated the union's cause.10 To correct these
abuses and procedural inadequacies, Congress prohibited federal courts
from issuing temporary or permanent injunctions in most labor dis-
putes.1' For the remaining cases, the Act provided strict procedural
safeguards.'
2
In subsequent labor legislation, Congress gave no further attention
to the problem of strike injunctions; instead, in the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, Congress focused on the collective bargaining
agreement. Despite unclear Congressional intent, the Court interpreted
§ 301, which by its terms merely gave federal district courts jurisdic-
tion to hear suits for violation of collective bargaining agreements, 0
as a mandate for the creation of substantive federal law.' 4 Subsequently,
as the Court became ever more enthusiastic about arbitration'8 as a
means of resolving disputes under such agreements, it concluded in
Teamster's Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co. 10 that for some purposes
arbitration and strikes must be treated as mutually exclusive mecha-
nisms for dispute resolution.' 7 But, because Congress failed to specify
the relationship of § 301 to the Norris-LaGuardia Act,'$ the question
7. F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LAnoR INJUNarloN 200-02, 63-64 (1930) [herein.
after cited as FRANK URTER & GREENE].
8. Id. at 66-81.
9. Id. at 86-89.
10. See sources at note 66 infra.
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104, 105 (1964).
12. 29 U.S.C. §§ 107-12 (1964). See pp. 1606-07 infra.
13. See note 2 supra.
14. 353 U.S. at 451. Lincoln Mills began to fashion substantive law by making agree.
ments to arbitrate specifically enforceable. 353 U.S. at 449-56. This was necessary because
most state courts would not compel specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate.
See H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROCs 99 (1968).
15. See, e.g., Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 863 U.S. 574 (1960).
16. 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962).
17. Id. at 104-05.
18. The House version of the Labor Management Relations Act explicitly auttorized
federal courts to enjoin violations of collective bargaining agreements, HR, 3020, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 302(e) (1947), but this provision was eliminated by the conference corn.
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remained open whether, as a means of promoting arbitration, the
federal courts could enjoin a strike in violation of an express or im-
plied no-strike clause. Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson0 seemed to
settle the issue: "§ 301 was not intended to have any such partially
repealing effect upon such a long-standing, carefully thought out and
highly significant part of this country's labor legislation as the Norris-
LaGuardia Act."20
Federal courts, then, were forbidden to issue injunctions for viola-
tions of no-strike clauses. While state courts retained jurisdiction over
§ 301 suits under Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,2 they were
required by Lincoln Mills22 and Lucas Flour23 to apply federal substan-
tive law. But none of these cases decided whether the availability of in-
junctive relief was a matter of substantive law and thus whether the
state courts must apply the federal rule forbidding injunctions in order
not to undermine Sinclair. As a practical matter, however, unions
could remove § 301 suits to federal court under the federal question
removal procedures made applicable to § 301 by Avco Corp. v. Aero
Lodge 735,24 even though the question was specifically left open whether
federal courts were required to dissolve state court temporary injunc-
tive relief after removal. Even if the state court's order were temporarily
left standing, however, the federal court's final decision would presum-
ably end all injunctive relief. After Avco, then, the Court faced a
mittee, H. R. CoxF. REP'. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 65-66 (1947). Sec Sinclair Refining
Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 205-07 (1962).
19. 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
20. 370 U.S. at 203.
21. Speaking for the Court, Justice Stewart noted:
The dear implication of the entire record of the congressional debates in both 1946
and 1947 is that the purpose of conferring jurisdiction upon the federal district courts
was not to displace, but to supplement the thoroughly considered jurisdiction of the
courts of the various States over contracts made by labor organizations.
368 U.S. 502, 511 (1962).
22. We conclude that the substantive law to apply in suits under § 301(a) is federal
law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws....
The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem
.... Federal interpretation of federal law will govern, not state law ... But state
law, if compatible with the purpose of § S01, may be resorted to in order to find the
rule that will best effectuate the federal policy .... Any state law applied, however,
will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source of private
rights.
353 US. 448, 456-57 (1957).
23. "[1]n enacting § 301, Congress intended doctrines of federal labor law uniformly
to prevail over inconsistent local rules." 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962).
24. 390 U.S. 557 (1968). 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964) provides in part:
Actions removable generally.
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any dvil action
brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have
original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the
district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place
where such action is pending.
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dilemma of its own creation: while state courts theoretically retained
jurisdiction under Dowd Box, they were effectively deprived of it.
B. Boys Market v. Retail Clerks Union
In Boys Market, the Court reasoned that it could resolve these trou-
blesome federal-state problems either by overruling Sinclair or by
extending its holding to the states.2 5 The case involved a collective
bargaining agreement which contained both a broad arbitration clause
making any dispute over the terms of the agreement subject to arbitra-
tion and a no-strike clause co-extensive with the arbitration clause.'"
The union struck over the employer's refusal to have union members
undertake work already completed by non-union employees. After an
unsuccessful attempt to invoke the contractual arbitration procedure,
the employer obtained a temporary restraining order from the Cali-
fornia Superior Court. The union removed the case to a federal district
court, which ordered the parties to arbitrate the underlying dispute
and simultaneously enjoined the strike. When the Court of Appeals
reversed, it was in turn reversed by the Supreme Court, which ex-
plicitly overruled Sinclair.
But, by holding that federal courts could now grant injunctions
against union strikes over arbitrable issues, the Court only skirted
the federal-state questions which it had intended to resolve. Under
25. "It is undoubtedly true that each of the foregoing objections to Sclair-Avteo
could be remedied either by overruling Sinclair or by extending that decision to the
states." 398 U.S. 235, 247 (1970).
26. "ARTICLE XIV
"ADJUSTMENT AND ARBITRATION
"A. CONTROVERSY, DISPUTE OR DISAGREEMENT.
"Any and all matters of controversy, dispute or disagreement of any kind or
character existing between the parties and arising out of or in any way
involving the interpretation or application of the terms of this Agreement ...
[with certain exceptions not relevant to the instant case] shall be settled and
resolved by the procedures and in the manner hereinafter set forth.
"B. ADJUSTMENT PROCEDURE.
"C. ARBITRATION.
"1. Any matter not satisfactorily settled or resolved in Paragraph B herein.
above shall be submitted to arbitration for final determination upon written
demand of either party....
"4. The arbitrator or board of arbitration shall be empowered to hear and
determine the matter in question and the determination shall be final and
binding upon the parties, subject only to their rights under law ....
"D. POWERS, LIMITATIONS AND RESERVATIONS.
"2. Work Stoppages. Matters subject to the procedures of this Article shall be
settled and resolved in the manner provided herein. During the term of this
Agreement, there shall be no cessation or stoppage of work, lock-out, picketing
or boycotts, except that this limitation shall not be binding upon either party
hereto if the other party refuses to perform any obligation under this Article
or refuses or fails to abide by, accept or perform a decision or award of an
arbitrator or board."
398 U.S. at 238-39 n.3.
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Sinclair, those states which permitted injunctions were out of step
with federal policy; after Boys Market, those which do not are out of
step. Nor does Boys Market confront the problem of how a federal
court is to treat a state court injunction in conflict with federal policy
when the action is removed from the state forum.
Boys Market also dramatically resuscitated the federal injunctive
power for use in the enforcement of arbitration clauses, without fully
exploring the possibilities of abuse.
The very purpose of arbitration procedures is to provide a mech-
anism for the expeditious settlement of industrial disputes with-
out resort to strikes, lock-outs, or other self-help measures. This
basic purpose is obviously undercut if there is no immediate,
effective remedy for those very tactics which arbitration is designed
to obviate.27
The Court argued that Norris-LaGuardia's policy of "nonintervention
by the federal courts [should] yield to the overriding interest in the
successful implementation of the arbitration process." Thus, it said,
"[t]he core purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is not sacrificed by
the limited use of equitable remedies to further this important pol-
icy."2
8
In an attempt to insure that the abuses which the Norris-LaGuardia
Act was designed to correct would not reappear, the Court established
guidelines for the district courts to follow when granting injunctive
relief:2 9 (1) the collective bargaining agreement must contain a man-
datory adjustment or arbitration procedure; (2) the court must first
determine that the strike is over a grievance which both parties are
contractually bound to arbitrate; (3) the court must order the em-
ployer to arbitrate as a condition of his obtaining an injunction against
the strike. Beyond these specific guidelines, the court, according to
Boys Market, must consider whether issuance of an injunction would
be warranted under ordinary principles of equity.30
II. The Guidelines for Granting Injunctive Relief
By establishing these guidelines, the Court implicitly acknowledged
its general responsibility to implement the policies behind the Norris-
27. 398 US. at 249.
28. 398 U.S. at 252-53.
29. These guidelines were first suggested by Justice Brennan in his Sinclair diszent,
370 U.S. at 228-29.
30. 398 US. at 254.
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LaGuardia Act, even if the Act itself was "responsive to a situation
totally different from that which exists today."81 The Court reasoned
that while judicial intervention on behalf of employers was unaccept-
able in 1932 when the unions were weak, intervention is today neces-
sary under some circumstances, because unions have become strong
and mature. "Congressional emphasis shifted from protection of the
nascent labor movement to the encouragement of collective bargaining
and to administrative techniques for the peaceful resolution of indus-
trial disputes. 32 Relying on its perception of this shift in emphasis,
the Court justified the use of injunctions to halt strikes by arguing
that industrial peace is best preserved through the enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements, including agreements to arbitrate.
Attempts to enforce agreements to arbitrate are, in turn, undermined
by strikes violating no-strike clauses.83
The Court's argument for creating an exception to the anti-injunc-
tion provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act is hardly compelled by
either history, statutory interpretation or the Court's role, relative to
that of other institutions, in making national labor law. The eight
years between the promulgation of the Sinclair decision and its over-
ruling did not contain any changes which made the issue any less close
or which gave the Court new guidance through the tangled web of
conflicting policies. That unions are strong today may be testimony
more to the effectiveness of the Norris-LaGuardia Act than to its
obsolescence. Nor was § 301-the statutory basis for the Boys Market
decision-a clear mandate for partial repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.3 4 As Justice Frankfurter contended in his dissent in Lincoln Mills,
Congress may have intended § 301 to be merely jurisdictional. Even if
§ 301 is substantive and reflects the policies embodied in the Labor
Management Relations Act generally, there is no clear guidance from
the Congress about which of two conflicting national labor policies
should prevail.36 The conclusion that labor relations are today so al-
31. 398 U.S. at 250.
32. 398 U.S. at 251.
33. The Court's second argument that injunctive relief is necessary to encotrage
employers to enter into arbitration agreements is rather specious in light of the fact that
over 94% of all collective bargaining agreements already have grievance arbitration pro.
cedures. See 2 BNA COLL. BARG.: NEG. & CoNT. 51:6 (1970).
34. See 353 U.S. 448, Appendix (1957); Wellington & Albert, Statutory Interpretation
and the Political Process: A Comment on Sinclair v. Atkinson, 72 YALE L.J. 15[7 (1963),
Winter, Labor Injunctions and Judge-Made Labor Law: The Contemporary Role of
Norris-LaGuardia, 70 YALE L.J. 70 (1960).
35. 353 U.S. 460-62 (1956).
36. 353 US. 448, 452 ("The legislative history of § 301 is somewhat cloudy and con-
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tered as to justify a change in national labor law seems a judgment
best left, if possible, to the Congress, with its unique capacity for fact-
finding.
Given its decision in Lincoln Mills that § 301 was substantive, the
Court was left to fashion the law from the competing policies of en-
suring industrial peace, enforcing collective bargaining agreements
and withholding injunctions. Sinclair resolved that conflict by with-
holding injunctions even where a strike was in violation of a no-strike
clause, thus undermining effective enforcement of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. In reaching the opposite conclusion by rebalancing
the conflicting policies, Boys Market arguably reaches a better result,
given the fact that after Lincoln Mills the Court had to make some
choice in the area. In the era before Norris-LaGuardia, injunctions
were used to quash union organizational efforts. In the Boys Market
setting, the injunction is being used as a tool to enforce the bargain
which the parties have made. The enforcement of the no-strike clause
certainly is consistent with respecting freedom of contract and insuring
industrial peace, the goals sought when enforcing the collective bar-
gaining agreement.37 The centrality of the collective bargaining agree-
ment in the national regulatory scheme as the means by which private
parties order industrial relations further justifies this emphasis on
contract enforcement.
A. Identifying Proper Situations
Before examination of the proper procedures for determining when
the facts of a case constitute a union action which falls within the
"injunction situation," it is necessary to define in clear though general
terms the situations in which a court can properly enjoin strikes. The
Boys Market decision seems to require only that the strike be over an
arbitrable grievance, without regard to the presence, language, and/or
intent of a no-strike clause. But absent congressional modification of
Norris-LaGuardia, the conflicting policies in the area would suggest
that the power of the courts to issue injunctions be narrowly con-
strued; that is, the power should be limited to those situations where
the policies of ensuring industrial peace through arbitration and of
promoting freedom of contract by enforcing collective bargaining
agreements both dearly support the granting of an injunction. In
fusing.") Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the judicial Process: The Lincoln
Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. Rnv. 1 (1957).
37. H. WE=lNGToN, supra note 14, at 91-125.
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practical terms, an injunction should issue only when the dispute is
one which the parties have agreed to arbitrate and over which the
union has in fact agreed not to strike.
It follows, then, that a court should enforce the collective bargaining
agreement by injunction if necessary when the parties have agreed to
an express no-strike clause as well as an arbitration clause. Although
the Boys Market agreement contained an express no-strike clause, the
Court suggested that in the absence of such a clause, it would imply a
no-strike clause co-extensive with the arbitration clause 8 under the
principle of contract interpretation first enunciated in Teamsters Local
174 v. Lucas Flour Co.39 Yet, as Justice Black noted in dissent in Lucas
Flour, employers regularly bargain for the inclusion of no-strike
clauses, and the absence of a no-strike clause usually indicates that the
parties considered and rejected such a clause.40 The industrial peace
through arbitration rationale is not demonstrably of greater impor-
tance than freedom of contract in suits under § 001. In injunction
proceedings, implying a no-strike clause would subordinate to indus-
trial peace not only freedom of contract but also the Norris-LaGuardia
Act.41 To issue an injunction, a court would first have to add a tern
to the contract that the parties did not bargain for and then enforce
the term through injunctive relief in the face of a general legislative
policy against injunctions. In addition to avoiding such judicial manip-
ulation, requiring an express no-strike clause, as suggested here, would
have the practical effect of placing the burden of bargaining for a no-
strike clause on the employer, where it has traditionally been.4-'
In the converse situation, where there is a no-strike clause but no
arbitration clause or where the coverage of the arbitration clause is
narrower than that of the no-strike clause, the same requirement should
apply; that is, an injunction should not be issued unless the dispute
38. 398 U.S. 235, 248 n. 16,254 (1970).
39. In Lucas Flour the Court implied a no-strike clause coextensive with the arbitration
clause. 369 U.S. 95, 104-05 (1962). Commentators are divided over the propriety of this
decision. See, e.g., H. WEFLLINGTON, supra note 14, at 122 (opposing the Court's posltlou):
but see Summers, Collective Agreements and the Law of Contracts, 78 YALr 1. J. 525,
558-61 (1969).
40. 369 U.S. 109 (1962). Some form of no-strike clause appears in 95% of all collective
bargaining agreements. 2 BNA CoLL. BARG.: NEC. S. CoNT. -77:1 (1964).
41. It should be acknowledged that prohibiting a court from implying a no-strike
clause in an injunction action may be inconsistent with the Lucas Flour holding that a
no-strike clause may be implied in a damage action. If contract interpretation Is not to
depend upon the nature of the relief requested, it will be necessary for the Court to
overrule Lucas Flour completely, thereby denying damages in strikes over arbitrable
grievances where the parties have not also agreed to an express no-strike clause.
42. H. WELLINGTON, supra note 14, at 116-17."
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falls within both clauses. If a dispute is not arbitrable, the Court's owrl
justification for issuing an injunction despite Norris-LaGuardia-that
strikes over arbitrable issues undermine the arbitration process' 3-is
absent. The policies of Norris-LaGuardia should prevail. The practical
effect of this position is that the parties are likely to include broader
arbitration clauses in future contracts, a result favored by the Boys
Market decision. -4
B. Administering the Injunction Power
Employers value injunctions because they are fast and decisive, but
these very qualities make the unions fear that die injunction power
will be used improperly. That most strikes during the term of collective
bargaining agreements are quite short-more than half last no longer
than three days4 5-- increases the stakes. The employer is interested
primarily in speed, the union in procedural safeguards, particularly
notice and hearing. In a suit for an injunction under Boys Market,
the court must decide whether a grievance falls within the arbitration
and no-strike clauses of the collective bargaining agreement"' and
whether the employer is entitled to an injunction under general
equitable principles. If only broad procedural safeguards circumscribe
these decisions, some permissible strikes will be temporarily enjoined,
depriving the union by judicial intervention of an important economic
weapon. If strict procedural safeguards are established, impermissible
strikes may temporarily continue while the union is being given notice
and a hearing, thus closing down or restricting the employer's opera-
tions in the short term. Consonant with the suggested narrow reading
43. Indeed, the very purpose of arbitration procedures is to provide a mechanism
for the expeditious settlement of industrial disputes without resort to strikes, lock-
outs, or other self-help measures. 598 U.S. at 249.
44. Any incentive for employers to enter into such an agreement is necessarily dis-
sipated if the prindpal and most expeditious method by which the no-strike obliga-
tion can be enforced is eliminated.
398 U.S. at 248.
45. In 1967, of the 1,561 strikes that occurred during the term of the collective bar.
gaining agreement, 789 lasted less than three days. ANALYsis OF WoRu Srorv ¢--1967,
BULL. No. 1611, US. DEPT. OF LABOR, BuREAu OF LABOR STATISTCS, Table 15, (1969).
Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370 US. 195 (1962), provides a good example of the
kind of strike that takes place in the typical "breach of the no-strike clause" context.
The plaintiff complained of nine separate union strikes: (1) 8 hours/6 employees, (2) 24
hours/the Mason Dept., 12 hours/the Mechanical Dept., 9 hours/the Barrel House
employees-all of these strikes occurring on the same day, (3) 1 hour/73 employees,
(4) 1-3/4 hours/24 employees, (5) 2 hours/24 employees, (6) 8 hours/43 employees,
(7) 3-3/4 hours/71 employees, (8) 8 hours/800 employees, (9) 48 hours/999 employies-
this time over a grievance in behalf of three riggers who i'ere doced an aggregate of
$2.19 in their pay for having reported late.
46. If the conclusion of this Note is not correct, that no-strike clauses ought not be
implied, then the court or arbitrator need only decide whether a grievance is arbitrable.
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of Boys Market,47 the Court should, as a general matter, resolve proce-
dural questions in favor of the union to ensure that permanent injunc-
tions-or temporary restraining orders-are issued only in instances
where the union's activities are clearly in violation of a no-strike clause.
The major procedural issues involved in administering the injunc-
tion are: what presumptions should the court employ regarding factual
issues; who shall decide those factual issues; and how such issues shall
be decided-through an ex parte or an adversary proceeding. For rea-
sons to be discussed below, it is undesirable to impose rigid factual pre-
sumptions. Nor does the proper choice of court or arbitrator to decide
the factual questions necessarily guarantee fairness to the unions. Only
by requiring notice and hearing before the issuance of any order can
unions be relatively well protected against the possibility that legal
strikes will be enjoined.
The factual issues in a suit for an injunction are of two types, con-
tractual and equitable. The contractual issues are whether the strike
is over a grievance which is within the arbitration clause of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement and, as suggested in this Note, whether the
strike is in violation of an express no-strike clause. If, to protect the
unions, the Court wished to establish a presumption that the issue over
which the union was striking was not arbitrable, it would have to over-
rule Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,48 which created
a presumption that a dispute is arbitrable. Although reversing the War-
rior presumption would afford some protection to a union in the Boys
Market setting, it would undercut a basic part of the court-developed
arbitration doctrine. The resolution of doubts in favor of arbitrability
serves both industrial peace and freedom of contract goals.4 Because
of his familiarity with the industrial context, the arbitrator is usually
the best judge of whether a particular action falls within a gen-
eral arbitration clause. To reverse the presumption in favor of arbitra-
tion would severely diminish the present usefulness of the arbitration
device in industrial relations and impose on the courts a burden of
evaluating practices in particular industrial contexts for which they
are ill-equipped. To reverse the presumption only in the injunction sit-
uation is to take the inconsistent step of varying the principle of con-
47. See pp. 1599-1600 supra.
48. 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
49. M. TROTTA, LABOR AuBITRATION 126-31 (1961); Jones, Power and Prudence in
Arbitration of Labor Disputes: A Venture in some Hypotheses, 11 U.C.L.A. L. RKn'. 675,
778 (1964).
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tract interpretation with the remedy50 Thus, the presumption should
stand.51
Shifting the burden of proof with respect to no-strike dauses would
only lead to confusion. Since under the suggested interpretation of
Boys Mlarket the clause must be express, the only factual question is
whether the strike falls within the no-strike clause. When a no-strike
clause is expressly coextensive with the arbitration clause,62 a presump-
tion that a strike does not fall within the no-strike clause may lead to
the incongruous result that a dispute falls within the arbitration clause
but not within the no-strike clause. Of course, in those cases where the
no-strike clause is not expressly co-extensive, it might be possible to
shift the burden to the employer to prove that the strike violates the
no-strike clause, but by itself this would not provide meaningful pro-
tection for the unions.
In addition to resolving contractual issues, the court must determine
whether the employer is entitled to an injunction under general eq-
uitable principles. This requirement was intended to give the courts
the discretion which is necessary for effective use of the injunction
power. Of the three equitable principles mentioned specifically in Boys
Market, the first merely requires a finding that there is a strike or that
one is threatened. Another requires that the court consider "whether
the employer will suffer more from the denial of an injunction than
will the union from its issuance."' t Because Lucas Flour and Boys
Market proscribed strikes in violation of no-strike clauses, however,
unions suffer no legally cognizable injury from issuance of an injunc-
tion. Therefore, since employers will always "suffer more," the balance
of equities principle offers no protection to unions.
50. See note 41 supra. But should the Court require notice and hearing even before
granting temporary injunctive relief, as suggested by this Note, p. 1608 infra, the pre-
sumption of arbitrability need not be maintained. In a hearing for permanent relief
where the union has full opportunity to develop and argue its case the presumption of
arbitrability does not unduly harm the union. At a temporary relief hearing, however,
where the union lacks adequate time to fully prepare its case and where the necessity of
expeditious judicial determination prevents a detailed presentation of the issues, a
presumption of arbitrability would be extremely difficult for the union to meet. There-
fore, such a presumption would have the effect of undermining the minimal protections
offered to the union by the requirement of notice and hearing.
51. The Warrior presumption, though not an affirmative protection in favor of the
union, at least does no violence to freedom of contract; the parties must have provided
for arbitration before the presumption can arise. But in Lucas Flour the presumption
that parties intended the court to imply a no-strike clause co-extensive with the arbitra-
tion clause promotes industrial peace at the expense of freedom of contract. It is the
failure to take proper account of freedom of contract that u-rants reversing the Lucas
Flour presumption. See pp. 1600-01 supra.
52. The Boys Market no-strike clause is a good example of a no-strike clause expressly
co-extensive with the arbitration clause; see note 26 supra.
53. 398 U.S. at 254.
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The third principle, that the court must find irreparable injury to
the employer, might have proven a useful device for protecting unions.
In general, injury is irreparable if the extent of the injury cannot be
rationally ascertained or if monetary compensation is inadequate. Since
courts are accustomed to calculating business losses both in the labor
law and the ordinary contract situation, such losses ought to be consid-
ered rationally ascertainable. Monetary compensation may, however,
be inadequate if the employer must, as a practical matter, forgive dam-
ages at the next bargaining session. If, on the other hand, the damages
will be a subject of serious bargaining, the employer will receive his
due. Whatever the merits of this argument, Boys Market asserts that
"an award of damages after a dispute has been settled is no substitute
for an immediate halt to an illegal strike,"5 ' indicating a perfunctory
interpretation for the phrase "irreparable injury." Of course, it might
be possible to establish presumptions against the employer on each of
these three issues. But to do so would destroy the purpose of using the
injunction in the first place-to provide flexible and effective relief-
by making the injunction power rigid and unresponsive.
If shifting the presumptions about what must be proven to allow in-
junctive relief does not offer much promise for assuring that unions
are enjoined only in instances that clearly fall within the definition of
an "injunctive situation," shifting the decision-making power from
court to arbitrator may be a partial solution, at least in some cases. The
court's discretion is sufficiently broad to allow it to remit important
factual questions to the arbitrator where that is warranted in order to
make full use of the arbitrator's special familiarity5 with the industrial
setting. In a damage action, where time is not a factor, the Court has
wisely let the arbitrator determine not only the underlying merits of
a dispute5 but also the threshold questions of the scope of the arbitra-
54. While it is of course true, as respondent contends, that other avenues of re-
dress, such as an action for damages, would remain open to an aggrieved employer,
an award of damages after a dispute has been settled is no substitute for an
immediate halt to an illegal strike. Furthermore, an action for damages prosecuted
during or after a labor dispute would only tend to aggravate industrial strife and
delay an early resolution of the difficulties between employer and union.
398 U.S. at 238.
55. Steelworkers v. Warrior g: Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
56. In Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), the Court
held at 567-68:
The function of the court is very limited when the parties have agreed to submit all
questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It is confined to ascertaining
whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed
by contract . . . the parties should not be deprived of the arbitrator's judgment, when
it was his judgment and all that it connotes that was bargained for.
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tion clause and the applicability of the no-strike clause."7 Until Boys
Market there was no opportunity to decide whether the role of the ar-
bitrator in deciding these threshold questions would be the same in
injunction cases, where time is critical.r s
The Boys Market Court decided that, where the collective bargain-
ing agreement compels arbitration and proscribes strikes for all dis-
putes arising out of the contract but does not expressly provide who
shall decide the threshold questions of arbitrability and violation of the
no-strike clause, the courts shall decide those questions. When an em-
ployer is entitled to an injunction, a court can ordinarily hold a hear-
ing, rule on the violation of the no-strike clause, and issue an injunc-
tion more quickly than can an arbitrator; indeed, strikes in violation
of no-strike clauses are characteristically so short that most would be
over before the arbitration process were completed.
But Boys Market should not be read to preclude the parties from
providing expressly that the arbitrator shall decide the threshold ques-
tions as well as the underlying dispute.r, By so providing, the parties
intentionally waived the right to the faster ruling they might have re-
ceived from the court. Nor, for that matter, need the parties always
57. In Drake Bakeries v. Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254 (1962), the Court held that
when the collective bargaining agreement provided that the employer could grieve, and
when the arbitration clause was extremely broad-not stopping with disputes involving
questions of interpretation or application of any clause or matter covered by the contract
-then the threshold questions of arbitrability and applicability of the no-strike dause
should be deferred to the arbitrator.
58. Several commentators believe that the question of whether the no-strike clause
was breached is best left up to an arbitrator's judgment, even where the plaintiff seeks
an injunction. Professor Jones states the position dearly:
State judges (and for that matter, federal judges whose removal or remanding powvers
are exercised so as to preserve jurisdiction in state judges to enjoin) should be re-
quired to refer no-strike contractual disputes immediately to arbitration. Thee
matters are of paramount sensitivity in collective bargaining, and the Iudqc rIto is
not technically competent to displace the arbitrator's judgment in other" less cnsitive
areas of collective bargaining certainly ought not to be deemed to be so here.
Power and Prudence in Arbitration of Labor Disputes: A Venture in Some 1-potlheses.
11 U.C.L.A. L. Ra,. 675, 780 (1964). See, e.g., Arbitrability, 1951 Report of the Committee
on Improvement of Administration of Union-Employer Contracts, Section of Labor
Relations Law, A.B.A., reprinted in READiNGS ON LA13OR LAW (Re)nard ed. 1955); Keene.
The Supreme Court, Section 301 and No-Strike Clauses: From Lincoln Mills to Arco and
Beyond, 15 ViLL. L. R v. 32, 59-60 (1969); Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration
or Alice Through the Looking Glass, 2 Burr. L. Rnv. 1, 26 (1952); cf. Jones & Smith.
Management and Labor Appraisals and Criticisms of the Arbitration Process: A Report
with Comments, 62 MicH. L. REv. 1115 (1964); Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in
Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1024 (1955).
59. The following is an example of an express grant: "If a question arises as to
whether or not a defined grievance or stated issue is arbitrable under the provisions of
this Article, the question may be submitted to an arbitrator hereunder; if need be, at
the request of either party." (Consolidated Edison Co. of NY. Inc. and Brothers of
Consolidated Edison Employees Ind., cited at J 64,067, P-H, IWDm. Rr. LA. Arm.) 8% of
all collective bargaining contracts have such specific provisions, see, 2 BNA CoLL. BArz.:
NEG. & Cour. 72:2.
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sacrifice speed for the arbitrator's special competence. By including
an expedited grievance-arbitration procedure for alleged violations of
the no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement, the em-
ployer can be assured of obtaining fast relief and the union can be pro-
tected by receiving a fair hearing before the arbitrator. For example,
pursuant to such an agreement between Ford Motor Company and
United Auto Workers Local 588, the process of holding a hearing, mak.
ing an award, and obtaining court enforcement of the award took less
than twenty-four hours. 60 Under these circumstances, arbitration af-
fords effective relief without doing violence to the intentions of the
parties, and the court should defer to the agreement of the parties
rather than enforce the collective bargaining agreement through the
judicial system.
The most important "procedural aspect" of the injunction power in
the § 301 situation is whether the power is to be administered through
ex parte proceedings or through the adversary process. When the arbi-
trator is the proper decision-maker, the procedures agreed upon by the
parties will protect the union's concomitant right to due process. When
the court is the proper forum, however, the court's own rules must
safeguard the union. In formulating rules to guarantee due process,
the courts should keep in mind that the historic abuse of the injunc-
tion power derived in large part from denial of notice and hearing to
the union and from the unlimited scope and duration of restraining
orders.
In determining what rules should be adopted as to the crucial ques-
tions of notice and hearing-or the permitted duration of the tem-
porary restraining order if notice and hearing are not required-the
Court might turn for guidance to the safeguards which Norris-LaGuar-
dia provided for those cases in which injunctions are permissible, to the
provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, or to relevant state
rules.
Although the thrust of Boys Market is that suits to enjoin strikes in
violation of no-strike clauses are not governed by § 4 of the Norris-La.
Guardia Act, the anti-injunction section, this does not mean that the
entire Norris-LaGuardia Act is inapposite."' In particular, §§ 7-12 pro-
60. 63-2 ARB 8491 (May 20, 1963). For additional examples see United Parcel Service,
Inc., 41 LAB. ARB. 560 (1963) (hearing held and arbitrator's award rendered In 72 hours);
Matter of Ruppert (Engelhofer), 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129 (1958) (court noted that
the arbitrator had been able to hear the grievance and render his award in 48 hours),
61. The Norris-LaGuardia Act procedural safeguards for injunctive relief have been
followed by courts issuing injunctions against "minor" disputes under the Railway Labor
Act. As noted by Justice Brennan, 398 U.S. at 251-52, the Court in Brotherhood of
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vide safeguards applicable to a suit for injunctive relief in all labor
disputes not covered by § 4.62 If the Norris-LaGuardia safeguards are
applied, they offer some protection against improper restraining orders,
but do not afford adequate protection. The complaining party must
allege under oath that immediate and irreparable injury will occur if
an order is not issued and must be prepared to post security for the
damages suffered by the defendant should he later be found to have
been wrongfully enjoined.63 The court must limit its order to the
specific persons and issues involved, 4 and ex parte orders may run for
no longer than five days. 5
But the Norris-LaGuardia safeguards do not sufficiently protect the
union from improper judicial intervention on the side of the employer
if the policy guiding determinations about proper procedural rules is
the desire to prevent strikes not in breach of the agreement from being
enjoined--even if temporarily.00 Since injunctions may still be granted
without notice or hearing, there exists the very real possibility that a
certain number of permissible strikes will be enjoined, often breaking
the morale of the strikers and defeating the union's cause.07 Before a
R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago River & Ind. R. Co., 353 U.S. 30 (1957), had "accommodated"
Norris-LaGuardia to allow federal courts to enforce the Railway Labor Act by enjoining
strikes over "minor" disputes. In that case, as in Boys Market, the Court failed to specify
what source of law the federal courts should turn to in order to determine what proce-
dural safeguards to apply before issuing injunctions. In subsequent cases, however, the
courts have followed the Norris-LaGuardia procedural safeguards provided that the dis-
pute is a "labor dispute" within the meaning of § 13 of the Norris.LaGuardia Act and
provided that the Norris-LaGuardia procedural safeguards have not been superseded by
more specific safeguards in the Railway Labor Act itself, in which case the latter are fol-
lowed. See Rutland Ry. Corp. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng., 307 F.2d 21 (2d Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 945 (1963); Long Island R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive
Eng., 290 F. Supp. 100 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Comment, Enjoining Strikes and Maintaining the
Status Quo in Railway Labor Disputes, 60 COLUMr. L. REv. 381, 386 (1960).
62. But see Perry & Sons v. Robillotto, 23 App. Div. 2d 949, 260 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1965),
holding that a strike in violation of a no-strike clause is not a "labor dispute" within
the meaning of the New York "Little" Norris-LaGuardia Act.
63. 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1964).
64. 29 U.S.C. § 109 (1964) thus prevents vague, sweeping injunctions designed to enjoin
large numbers of people from participating in a broad range of activities.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 7 (1964). Should the Court decide that strikes in violation of no.strike
clauses are entirely outside of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, Federal Rule 65 would be ap-
plicable. However, Rule 65 has essentially the same provisions as §§ 7-12 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, except that temporary restraining orders may run up to ten days.
66. See pp. 1601-02 supra; Professor Aaron states:
In a great many, if not the majority, of cases ... the restraining order or preliminary
injunction spells defeat for the defendant's cause. Every objective study of injunctions
in action since the publication of the pioneer work by Frankfurter and Greene has
noted this result. Such a result is wrong, not because we can be sure the defendant's
cause is just and its objectives lawful-they frequently are not-but because the
judicial power has been used prematurely and unfairly to aid one party to a private
dispute.
Labor Injunctions in the State Courts-Part II, 50 VA. L. REV. 1147, 1157-58 (1964);
accord, Witte, The Federal Anti-Injunction Act, 16 MNr. L. REv. 638 (1932); FRatMtrUMr
& Gp r_. 200-01.
67. Frankfurter and Greene believed the only adequate solution to this source of
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judge grants an injunction, the union ought to have the chance to be
heard either on the specific factual issues defining the "injunctive situ-
ation" or, given the generality of the equity powers, on other matters
relating to the fairness of the remedy in the particular instance.
Therefore, rather than follow the Norris-LaGuardia safeguards on
the use of the ex parte temporary restraining order, the Court might
wisely adopt the Minnesota rule, which eliminates the ex parte re-
straining order altogether.08 Minnesota requires that before any form
of injunction may be issued, the defendant must be given adequate
notice and a full hearing at which to cross-examine the plaintiff's wit-
nesses and put forward testimony of his own. 9 Absent Supreme Court
adoption of such a rule, district courts may exercise their discretion to
withhold temporary relief in favor of a full hearing on the merits, or
at least to issue a show cause order, thereby permitting the union to
respond.
III. Boys Market in the State Courts
A. The Procedure-Substance Test
The impact of Boys Market will be determined in part by the extent
to which it is binding upon state courts. Had § 301, or the Supreme
Court, given the state courts express directions as to what portions of
federal labor law to follow, the state courts would have been bound by
the supremacy clause of the Constitution to follow the federal law,
even though the state courts may have regarded the federal law as
merely "procedural"7 0 or in conflict with important state policy."1 In-
stead, the Court has consistently required only that state courts apply
"substantive" federal law in § 301 cases,72 leaving state courts free to
potential abuse was complete abolition of the ex parte restraining order. Their belief was
"based upon a realization that the ex parte order possesses potentialities of great evil and
is too rarely of sufficient immediate necessity to outweigh the dangers of Its abite,"
FRANKFURTER & GREENE 224.
68. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.14 (1961).
69. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.14 (1961).
70. Bindczyck v. Finucane, 342 U.S. 76 (1951): In § 338 of the Nationality Act of 1910,
8 U.S.C. § 738 (1964), Congress provided explicit and exclusive procedural rules that
must be followed when revoking naturalization; based on evidence outside the record-
the Court held those rules are equally applicable to state courts hearing naturalization
cases, state procedural rules to the contrary notwithstanding.
71. Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912); Testa v. Katt, 300 US. 380
(1947); Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. 95 (1962); cf. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.
Co. v. Mims, 242 U.S. 532 (1917); Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923), In which
Justice Holmes held:
Whatever springes the state may set for those who are endeavoring to assert rights
that the state confers, the assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably
made, is not to be defeated under the name of local practice.
72. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 869 U.S. 95, 104, 102-03 (1962).
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apply their own "procedural" rules. But of course the distinction be-
t-ween substance and procedure is elusive, varying with the purpose for
which the distinction is drawn.73 A test for state courts to use in
deciding which law to apply must therefore balance the particular fed-
eral and state interests involved in § 301 suits.
On numerous occasions, the Court has insisted that national la-
bor policy demands uniform application of federal labor law.74 The
problem of labor disputes is national in scope and importance; labor-
management relations are appropriately regulated by federal law. Fur-
ther, without uniformity there would be forum-shopping to take
advantage of varying state rules of law, and this would seriously un-
dermine the collective bargaining process by making the parties uncer-
tain of the legal effect of a proposed or existing agreement. More
particularly, the federal policy favoring the peaceful settlement of in-
dustrial disputes through arbitration and the enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements should be implemented consistently in both
federal and state courts to satisfy the federal interest in uniformity.
State interests in § 801 suits are much less strong, at least as § 301
is presently interpreted. While Dowd Box held that state courts retain
jurisdiction to hear cases under § 301,75 Lucas Flour deprived the states
of the right to develop independent law governing collective bargain-
ing agreements (although the opinion suggested that superseded state
rules might provide a fruitful source for federal common law under
§ 301).7c However, it should be remembered that prior to Lincoln Mills
the states had a strong substantive interest in the laws they fashioned
to deal with labor disputes. The intrusion of federal remedies in an
area of strong state interest was one aspect of Lincoln Mills that drew
sharp criticism. 77 It was only the Court's interpretation of § 801 which
destroyed that state substantive interest. What remains is, thus, a
73. D. CURmE, FE AL CouRrs 629-34 (1968); H. HARr 8 H. WAEcntsLtm, TiE FDEnAL
COURTS AND THE FERAL SYsrEh 659-60 (1953); F. JAMES,. CIvIL PRoCEMuRE 1 (1065); Cook,
"Substance" and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933).
74. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 US. 95 (1962); International
UAIV v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1966).
75. 3968 U.S. 502, 511 (1962).
76. 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962).
77. [Tjhe problem therefore calls for a balancing of the gravity of the constitutional
issue raised by referring to state law against the damage to the fabric of federallsm
that would be caused by a holding that federal law applies. Since the prevailing and
in our view sound opinion is that section 301 is constitutional, adoption of state law
is, we think, in order.... [I]nstead of achieving uniformity by imposing its own law,
may not Congress, hoping for harmony and orchestration though expecting and
desiring some continuing diversity, hand the conductor's baton to thc federal courts
rather than giving them a set of cymbals with -which to drown out all other sounds?
Bickel &-- Wellington, supra note 36, at 19-20.
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weaker, solely procedural interest. When a state court exercises juris-
diction over a § 301 suit, the enforcement proceedings take place in the
state forum, thus calling into play the state's legitimate interest in the
smooth and economical functioning of its judicial machinery.18 While
it is clear, then, that states retain an interest in § 301 litigation, that
interest is a limited one.
As in other circumstances where state courts exercising jurisdiction
over federally-created rights have had to apply substantive federal law,"
state courts should employ an "outcome-determinative" test to deter-
mine what law is substantive under § 301: if, in choosing a forum for
his suit, a party would make his choice on the basis of a reasonable
belief that a particular rule in one forum would produce a significantly
different outcome in the litigation, then that rule is substantive and
must be applied by state courts.80 In applying this test, a court should
look not at whether the plaintiff in the case before it chose the state
forum because he thought that he could obtain a better outcome under
a particular state rule. Rather, a court should consider whether a rea-
sonable party in a substantial number of cases would so choose on the
basis of the rule in question.81 Use of the test, then, would yield rules
78. In disputes involving choice between state laws these procedural Interests have
often been held to outweigh the substantive interests of the "foreign" state. See 17. GooD-
Wcl & E. SCOLES, CONFLIcT OF LAws §§ 80, 91 (1964); ST UMBERG, CONFLIT oF LAws 128
(1937); RESrATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, ch. 12, Introductory Note (1934); Cook, supra note
73; Lorenzen, The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws, 43 YAIX L.j. .11 (1923);
Choice of Law Governing Proof, 58 HARV. L. REv. 153, 195 (1914); Sedler, The Erie Out-
come Test as a Guide to Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of laws, 37 NY.U. L. RLV.
813 (1962).
79. E.g., cases under the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1961),
80. When federal courts enforce state-created rights, Erie R.R. v. Tompk s, 801 U.S.
64 (1938), and progeny, the Supreme Court applies an outcome-determinative test to decide
whether a state rule is substantive and therefore must te applied by the federal district
courts in diversity actions. In Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965), the Court made
clear that a rule is outcome-determinative only if it would affect a litigant's choice of
forum. The Court reasoned:
Not only are non-substantial, or trivial, variations not likely to raise the sort of
equal protection problems which troubled the Court in Erie; they are also unlikely to
influence the choice of forum. The "outcome-determinative" test therefore cannot be
read without reference to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum
shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.
In Brown v. Western R. of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294, 302 (1949), the Court recognized the
analogy between federal courts applying state law and state courts applying fcderal law.
Attempting to define the "substantive" federal law that the state court was required to
enforce, Mr. Justice Black said, "The terms substance and procedure are not meaninglets
even though they do not have fixed, undeviating meanings. They derive content from the
functions they serve here in precisely the same way in which we have applied them in the
reverse situation-when confronted with the problem whether the Federal courts respected
the substance of State-created rights, as required by the rule in Erie."
81. This test meets Hart's objection that an outcome-determinative test lacks logical
boundaries and can thus be used to deprive forum states from using any of their own
procedural rules. See Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUOt. L.
Rxv. 489 (1954).
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applicable to future cases rather than produce ad hoc determinations
about the state of mind of one of the parties. In an analogous "reverse
Erie" situation, such an outcome-determinative test has been used to
balance federal and state interests in litigation brought under the
Federal Employers Liability Act,8 2 and has required state courts to
apply federal rules regarding burden of proof,s3 presumptions and res
ipsa loquitor,8 4 jury trial, 5 and pleading.8 0
In a Boys Market setting, if the state rules of appellate procedure
provide that an appeal from final judgment must be taken within 20
days, but the federal rule allows 30 days,8 7 the federal rule providing
the added time might well determine the outcome of a lawsuit in the
sense that if the party waited tventy-five days before filing his appeal
he would be barred from going forward in the state court system, but
free to proceed with his appeal in the federal courts. But the federal
rule would not be "outcome-determinative" because the rule would
probably not affect a litigant's choice of forum or would do so in only
an insubstantial number of cases. On the other hand, federal rules of
discoverys in a state with strict code pleading requirements might in
a substantial number of cases cause an employer rationally to believe
that he is more likely to obtain an injunction in a state court because
the union will be hampered by narrow state rules of discovery. Conse-
quently, the rules of discovery would be outcome-determinative under
the § 301 test and thus substantive.8 9
The outcome-determinative test will be a strong force toward uni-
form application of federal law at the expense of state law. But if one
accepts the primacy of uniform federal labor law and the consequent
need for state substantive law to yield before analogous federal law,
the relative strength of federal and state interests fully justifies this
result.9 0
82. 45 US.C. §§ 51-60 (1964). See, Hill, Substance and Procedure in State FELA Actions
-The Converse of the Erie Problem?, 17 OHIO ST. L. R1n'v. 384 (1956); Note, State Enforce-
ment of Federally Created Rights, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1551 (1960).
83. Central Vermont Ry. Co. v. White, 238 U.S. 507 (1915).
84. See, e.g., New Orleans & N.E. R. v. Harris, 247 US. 367 (1917).
85. Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. RL.L 342 U.S. 359 (1952).
86. Brown v. Western R. of Alabama, 338 US. 294 (1949).
87. FED. R. APP. P. 4.
88. FkD. P. Civ. P. 26-37.
89. Cf. Bartosic, Injunctions and Section 301: The Patchwork of Avco and Philadelphia
Marine on the Fabric of National Labor Policy, 69 COLU.. L. REV. 980 (1969); but see
Dunau, Three Problems in Labor Arbitration, 55 VA. L. REv. 427, 468-73, 478-82 (1969).
90. See pp. 1609-10 supra.
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B. State court injunctions
In the wake of Boys Market, it is necessary to determine whether the
availability of injunctive relief is substantive. Twenty-five states pres-
ently have statutes which parallel the Norris-LaGuardia Act. However,
ten of these states have made exceptions allowing injunctive relief to
issue against strikes in breach of no-strike clauses; 1 only the remaining
fifteen prohibit their courts from enjoining such strikes. 2 The ques-
tion arises whether or not these fifteen states may continue to withhold
injunctive relief for strikes in breach of no-strike clauses.
Commentators and courts have long recognized that remedies are
often integral parts of substantive rights.93 In suits arising under the
Emergency Price Control Act94 state courts were required to apply fed-
eral rules relating to remedy.95 Moreover, the availability of a particu-
lar remedy is precisely the kind of fact likely to influence a litigant's
choice of forum, especially in the labor law context. According to Pro-
fessor Aaron,
[a]n order to halt a strike is such a completely different remedy
91. Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 80-4-6(2)(c) (1963); Kansas, KAN. STAT, ANN,
§ 44-809(15) (1964); Louisiana, act declared unconstitutional in Douglas Publ. Serv. Cotp.
v. Gaspard, 225 La. 972, 74 So.2d 192 (1954); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.11(1)
(1961), see McLean Distr. Co. v. Brewery Drivers Local 993, 254 Minn. 204, 9N.W.2d
514, cert. denied, 360 U.S. 917 (1959); Montana, see State v. District Court, 61 L.R.R.M.
2159 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 1965); New York, Perry & Sons v. Robilotto, 23 App. Dlv. 2d 919,
260 N.Y.S.2d 158 (1965); Oregon, see Weisfield, Inc. v. Haeckel, 28 L.RR.M. 2055 (Ore. Cir,
Ct. 1951); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 206(d) (1963); see Philadelphia Matine
Trade Ass'n v. I.L.A., 382 Pa. 326, 115 A.2d 733 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 843 (1956):
Washington, injunction provisions of Act declared unconstitutional in Blanchard v,
Golden Age Brewing Co., 188 Wash. 396, 63 P.2d 397 (1936); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 111.06(2)(c) (1959).
92. These are: Arizona, ARz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1808 (1956); Connecticut, CONN. GivN.
STAT. REV. §§ 31-112-13 (1958); Hawaii, HAWAi REV. LAWS . 380 (Stipp. 19063) I(lah11,
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-706 (1948); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch, 48, § 2a (Sml-l.-Iurd 1950),
Indiana, IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-501 (1965); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. "6, § 5 (1901):
Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 100, §§ 63-75 (1957); Massachusetts, MASS. GrN. LAws ANN.
ch. 214, § 9A (1958); New Jersey, N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A; 15-51-58 (1951); New Mexico,
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-2-1 (1953); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-08-01 (1959); Rhode
Island, R.I. GEN. LAWs ANN. § 28-70-2 (1968); Utah, UTAH CODE 3-1-19.5 (1969); Wyoming,
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 27-239 (1957).
93. See, e.g., Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535 (1866). Judge Swait
commented: "Nothing can be more material to the obligation than the means of enforce-
ment. Without the remedy the contract may, indeed, in the sense of law, be said not to
exist, and its obligation to fall within the class of those moral and social duties which
depend for their fulfillment wholly upon the will of the individual. The ideas of validity
and remedy are inseparable, and both are parts of the obligation, which is guaranteed by
the Constitution against invasion." 71 U.S. at 552; Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183
(1947); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956); H. HART & 1-. WrctHSLr, Upra
note 73 at 474-77; J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRAcTIcE jI 2.09, 65.18; Hill, supra note 82, at 413;
Comment, The Equitable Remedial Rights Doctrine, 55 YALE L.J. 401 (1946); Note,
Parallel State and Federal Remedies, 71 IARV. L. REV. 513 (1958). lut see Isaacson, The
Grand Equation: Labor Arbitration and the No.Strike Clause, 48 A.B.A.J. 914 (1962);
Wellington, Labor and the Federal System, 26 CHI. L. REV. 552 (1959).
94. 56 Stat. 34, as amended, 58 Stat. 632, 640, 50 U.S.C. App., Supp. V, § 925 (1969).
95. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
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from an order to arbitrate the dispute or a judgment of damages
for breach of contract that it must be considered a separate right
rather than an alternative form of reliefY0
The issue of the anti-injunction provision in state law might arise
in the following manner. A union in a little Norris-LaGuardia state
strikes over a grievance that the employer has allegedly refused to ar-
bitrate. The employer preferring to arbitrate the grievance rather than
undergo a strike would want to bring suit in federal court under § 01.
However, in anticipation of this, the union hurries to state court in an
attempt both to force the employer to arbitrate and to avoid the federal
injunction law. What law, therefore, should the state court judge apply?
Here, a rational union has considered the availability (or lack of avail-
ability) of an injunction when choosing its forum. Indeed, in this case,
avoiding an injunction may be the union's only reason for going to
court. Since in a substantial number of cases the rational union might
well consider the availability of an injunction when choosing its forum,
the rule governing injunctive relief is thus substantive under the § 301
outcome-determinative test 97-state courts must make injunctive relief
available.98 This result reduces forum-shopping while facilitating uni-
form enforcement of the laws. Because the availability of an injunction
no longer turns on the choice of forum, labor and management can
take proper account in their bargaining of the certainty that an injunc-
tion will be available for strikes in violation of an express no-strike
clause. Admittedly, this reasoning eliminates a substantial state rem-
edy; but, as noted, such an occurrence is the necessary result of the
Court's interpretation of § 301 starting with Lincoln Mills. The Court's
modification of important state law-without explicit authority or
guidance from Congress-underscores the need for congressional evalu-
ation of the law being promulgated under § 301.19
The right to injunctive relief which emerged from Boys Market,
however, is a right qualified by strict guidelines and safeguards. These
qualifications, in present form or altered and augmented as suggested
in this Note, must, if substantive, be applied by all the states.
On facts similar to those in Boys Market, use of state court rules con-
96. Aaron, Strikes in Breach of Collective Agreements: Some Unanswered Questions,
63 COLUM. L. Rav. 1027, 1035 (1963).
97. For a discussion of the possibility that uniformity might be accomplished by fed-
eral removal, see pp. 1615-16 infra.
98. State courts must enforce federally created rights and remedies suc as those
arising under § 301, if they enforce analogous state-created rights. See D. CuraE, supra
note 73, at 365-69; H. HAR - H. WEcHsLER, supra note 73, at 395-99; Note, State Enforce-
ment of Federally Created Rights, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1551, 1551-54 (1960).
99. See pp. 1608-11 supra.
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trolling the granting of injunctions would yield a variety of results.1 °
There are marked differences in the nature of proof required from the
plaintiffs, 10 1 necessity of notice to the defendant, 0 2 the length of time
a temporary injunction may run, 0 3 and the size of security bond re-
quired. 0 4 Nor do states uniformly require that the employer must
agree to arbitration as a condition for issuance of an injunction or that
the no-strike clause be express.
Since the safeguards sun-rounding injunctive relief often go to the
heart of the substantive right being enforced, the manner in which in-
junctive relief may be obtained and the extent of the relief obtaitable
are factors which are likely to influence a litigant's choice of forum. For
example, an employer who desires an injunction against a strike
100. Aaron, Labor Injunctions in the State Courts-Part 1: A Survey, 50 VA. L. RtV.
951 (1964); Stern, The Norris-LaGuardia Act and State Court injunctions Against Strikes
in Breach of a Collective Bargaining Agreement Under Section 301: Accommodation to,
Incompatibility, 39 TEMP. L.Q. (1960); Second Employers' Liability Cases, 228 U.S. 1
(1912); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); but cf. Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.RR.,
279 U.S. 337 (1929); Missouri ex ret. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950), Since
state courts are competent to hear contract cases they are competent to enforce labor-
management contracts under § 301. Furthermore, a state cannot decline jurlsdiction over
a suit enforcing a federally created right on the basis that the state would give a different
remedy for the analogous state-created right. Provided that the state court hls jtrls(Ilction
over the subject matter and that the remedy in question is not completely foreign to the
state court, it must take jurisdiction over the case and enforce the remedies provided by
the federal law. See Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 289 (191);
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
101. A comparison of the rules of Alabama, California, Minnesota, and New York
indicate a wide range of variation. The rules of California and New York require a
plaintiff to prove by verified complaint or affidavits that immediate and Irreparable
harm is likely to occur to the plaintiff before the defendant can be heard in opposition.
CAL. CODE CiV. P. § 527 (West 1967); N.Y.C.P.L.R. §§ 6312(a), 6313(a). Alabama requires
no particular quantum of proof, nor must the proof given be under oath. CoDE or ALA.
Tit. 7, §§ 1054, 1058 (1960). Minnesota requires that immediate and irreparable harm be
alleged by verified complaint or affidavit, and the plaintiff's proof must also be subject
to cross-examination by the defendant. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.14 (1966).
102. Alabama, California and New York rules allow temporary injunctive relief with-
out notice to the defendant when the court is satisfied that the plaintiff has met his
burden of proof. CODE Or ALA. Tit. 7, §§ 1054, 1058 (1960); CAL. Coot Cry. P. § 527 (West
1967); N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 6313(a). Minnesota has eliminated ex parte injunctive relief by
requiring that the defendant be given notice and an opportunity to be heard. MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 179.14 (1966).
103. The duration of a temporary restraining order is limited to fifteen days in the
California rule. CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 527 (West 1967). Minnesota limits the duration to
7 days with no opportunity for extension. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.14 (1966). New York
places no limit on the length of time a temporary restraining order may run, but does
require that a full hearing on the merits be scheduled as soon as possible. N.Y.C,P.L.R.
§ 6316(a). Alabama requires no time limit. CODE oF ALA., Tit. 7, §§ 1054, 1058.
104. California and New York rules require a plaintiff to post a security bond In
order to protect the defendant from any damages he may suffer as a result of a tempo-
rary restraining order later found to be improvidently granted. CAL. CODE CIV. P. § 529
(West 1967); N..C.P.L.R. § 6812(b). Although the Alabama Code technically rcquites
the plaintiff to post a security bond, the Alabama Supreme Court has ruled that failureto post a security bond does not render an ex parte injunction null and void. ranc s v.
Scott, 260 Ala. 590, 72 So. 2d 98 (1958). Minnesota requires no security bond because itrequires a full hearing in the first instance. S e p. 1608 supra.
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over an arbitrable issue but who is unwilling to arbitrate would bring
his suit in a state court if the state rule did not require him to arbi-
trate. Similarly, an employer wishing to stop a union's strike over an
issue excepted from the arbitration and no-strike clauses might seek
a temporary injunction in a state court which lacks the federal safe-
guards permitting only sworn proof of allegations and requiring secu-
rity bond from the plaintiff. The employer would risk little by pursu-
ing an unjustified claim for injunctive relief in such a state court,
whereas in federal court he would risk being charged with perjury or
losing his security bond.
In both cases, a plaintiff-employer would very likely seek a state
forum with less stringent safeguards, thus undermining strong federal
labor policy favoring the strict protection of the labor injunction from
judicial abuse. Since a litigant in a substantial number of cases may
rationally believe that the availability or non-availability of such safe-
guards will affect the outcome of his § 301 suit, the rules governing
these safeguards are substantive under the § 301 outcome-determina-
tive test.105 Again, the effect of Boys Market is to develop uniform
federal law at the expense of state law.
C. Removal
If a state court issues a temporary restraining order which violates
federal safeguards, the union may seek to remove the case to federal
court. Because the outcome-determinative test requires that state courts
grant injunctions in the same manner as federal courts, need for re-
moval in § 301 suits ought to be greatly diminished after Boys Market.
Nevertheless, the right to remove still exists 00 and may be of limited
value in protecting unions from state court abuse of the power to issue
temporary restraining orders; however slow the removal procedure, it
remains more expeditious than taking an appeal through the state
court system to the United States Supreme Court.107 If the union re-
105. Interests in uniform federal labor law, as reflected in the "outcome-determinative"
test, also require those few states with more restrictive injunctive relief safeguards (such
as Minnesota, see p. 1608 supra) to follow the federal balance that the Boys Markel
case has struck between anti-injunction policy and arbitration policy. It is therefore neces-
sary for such states to follow the federal injunctive relief guidelines.
106. See p. 1595 supra.
107. The federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1964), provides that a defendant
must file petition for removal within thirty days after receiving notice of the plaintiff's
claim and before final adjudication-in Boys Market situations, before issuance of a full
injunction. If the use of temporary restraining orders is not circumscribed, the union's first
note of the employer's claim is likely to be receipt of an em parte order. At that stage,
however, the union can remove to federal district court if it believes that the state court
judge did not correctly apply the federal safeguards.
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moves, the state court order remains in effect until dissolved. But
because the district court sits not as an appellate court reviewing a
final order but as a trial court reconsidering its own temporary order,
the federal judge has full discretion to apply the Boys Market stan-
dards himself and then modify or dissolve the order, as appropriate. 10 8
IV. Conclusion
In the series of cases that began with Lincoln Mills, the Supreme
Court promoted arbitration by expanding § 301, only arguably substan-
tive at the time of its enactment, into areas of substantive law formerly
the province of the states. Boys Market is particularly problematic in
that it not only compromises Norris-LaGuardia's anti-injunction power
but also eliminates state anti-injunction statutes, since the state must
apply substantive federal labor law uniformly if the national policies are
not to be frustrated and if rampant forum-shopping is not to result.108
This Note has argued that the courts must subsequently limit the de-
cision to those situations where the union has expressly agreed not to
strike and that they must develop and then apply strictly procedures
which guard against abuse of the injunction power. To honor the goal
of freedom of contract, the Court can legitimately employ the indus-
trial peace rationale to justify the granting of injunctions only when
it is dearly enforcing the agreement of the parties.
The attempt to reconcile the contradictory policies with consistent
rules, however, should not obscure the fact that the thorny statutory
and policy conflicts between § 301 and Norris-LaGuardia, and between
§ 301 and state law, are symptomatic of the general difficulties engen-
dered by Lincoln Mills. The legislative purpose and history of § 301
does not provide sufficiently precise direction to inform the Court's
"accommodation" of other well-established federal labor law doctrines
and to guide its intrusion into areas of traditional state concern. More-
over, Boys Market was predicated on an historical shift in the nature
of labor relations. But the role of describing that factual shift and
of drawing inferences from it rightly belongs to Congress.110 Without
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1450 (1964); see, e.g., Sharp v. Whiteside, 191 F. 156 (C.C. Tenn. 1883).
109. In Boys Market, the Court did not have before it a state court injunction and
thus did not have to overrule so important an aspect of state remedial law as an anti-
injunction statute. Nor, under Sinclair, had the Court addressed the problem of state
law permitting injunctions when federal law did not.
110. Possibly, of course, Congress would explicitly approve the law which the Court
has developed under § 301. Because Congress has the institutional capability to investigate
the factual assumptions which underlie both the Court's decisions and this Note, Con,
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guidance, the Court has embarked on the formulation of a complex
body of doctrine which inevitably affects the balance of power between
labor and management and between the federal government and the
states. The attempt to make this Court-created law internally consistent
further increases the conflicts with other federal and state law. 1 Fre-
quent judicial changes in § 801 law upset the expectations of the
parties to collective bargaining agreements and reallocate in an un-
systematic way the burden of bargaining on important issues. The
failure of Boys Market and its predecessors to resolve satisfactorily the
conflict between the policy favoring arbitration and that disfavoring
injunctions or the tension between the desire for uniformity and the
desire to give state courts a role under § .301 makes urgent congres-
sional evaluation and rationalization of the doctrines which have de-
veloped under § 301.
gress could at least base its legislation on answers to the recurring questions: How
strong are unions? Do parties bargain over no-strike clauses? Do courts still abuse the
injunction power?
111. H. WE-LiNGTON, supra note 14, at 100.
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